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Personal and Institutional Rights in Community*

GEORGE C. CHRISTIE"

This article is primarily concerned with the concept of justice in the relationship between the individual and his church and between the individual
and private educational institutions, particularly church affiliated educational
institutions. There are obviously many other types of private social institutions to which an individual may belong and it will, of course, sometimes be
necessary to consider the implications of justice in the individual's relations
with these other institutions as well. Nevertheless, a consideration of these
other areas of possible conflict between the interests of the individual and
those of the community will only be peripheral to my central purpose. Moreover, even within the areas of my primary concern, it must be recognized that
the importance and vast dimensions of the subject would defy any attempt to
discuss adequately all the myriad issues involved. Accordingly, having renounced all pretentions to encyclopedic coverage of my subject, I will focus
instead on several highlights that seem of particular interest and importance
at the present time.
"Justice" is a term of many meanings and uses. One important use of the
word is to refer to the law of the State which the moral philosophers tell us
is an ordinance of reason directed to the common good. Thus, one who violates the law of the State acts unjustly, for the law has specified what is just
or unjust in various particular situations. Another use of the term "justice" is
to. refer to the moral relationships between men which are anterior to, and
sometimes independent of, the civil law. I shall in the course of my article
refer to both of these notions, since any discussion of the relationship between
the individual and his church or between the individual and his school or
university involves both aspects of justice.
* This article is derived, with minor changes, from a paper scheduled to be delivered as part of a Workshop on Civil Rights and Social Justice sponsored by the
Preacher's Institute of the Catholic University of America.
** Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A., Columbia University, 1955; LL.B., Columbia University, 1957; Dipl. Intl. Law, Cambridge University, 1962; S.J.D., Harvard University, 1966.
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I. The State's Justice
A. Justice and the Church
Legal philosophers writing in the natural law tradition have had difficulty
in either reconciling or rejecting the impact of positive law on the relationship between the individual and his church. It is well enough to say "Render
unto Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's," but what, in actual
practice, does this mean? Jean Dabin, a great modem natural lawyer, who
taught at the University at Louvain, has said:
The relations of man with God, his Creator and supreme Good,
are governed, as to outward as well as inner acts, by morals, especially under the heading of the virtue of religion. They do not as
such belong to law, at least not the law of the civil society. Indeed,
when religion itself has been established in society by the ecclesiastical institution (which must give rise to a specifically ecclesiastical
law: Ubi societas ibi jus), the civil society as such has no competence in religious matters. This follows from the distinction between
the spiritual and temporal powers: It does not belong unto Caesar
to define the rights of God or to make them his concern. That task
and, for those who reject any church,
belongs strictly to the church
1
to the individual conscience.
Yet previously Dabin has recognized that all human relations of a temporal
order fall, to at least some degree, within the competence of the civil law. Insofar, therefore, as religion involves outward acts, which are by definition acts
which operate in the temporal order, how can it be immune from State
regulation? The problem is made more difficult in a religiously tolerant society
such as ours, where the principles of religious freedom and separation of
church and State are constitutionally enshrined, because it is very often not
the State which wants to intervene in religious matters but religious bodies
which actively seek the intervention of the State in matters that seem very
much, under Dabin's view, not to belong within the competence of positive
law. Dabin himself shows some inconsistency on this score. He states first of
all that civil society is under a duty "to proclaim the rule of freedom of worship and to safeguard it against any attack from whatever quarter, on the
part of private individuals or public officials."' 2 He then goes further and
states:
The safeguard of the law may indeed extend beyond this indispensable minimum. If the state deems it opportune it will lay down
1. Dabin, General Theory of Law 70, reprinted in
& DABIN, 229, 294 (Wilk transl. 1950).

LASK, RADBRUCH

2. Id. 1 71, at 294-95.
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rules to prohibit certain acts or attitudes showing ostentatious contempt with regard to religion, e.g., blasphemy, sacrilege, parody of
worship. Indeed, acts of that kind have nothing in common with the
freedom, guaranteed as such, of sincere antireligious propaganda:
Their sole aim is to shock the feelings of the religious part of the
population. The injury done to worship recoils to hit the worshippers: The act contrary to religion becomes a blameworthy 3violation
of respect for persons and often an attack upon national unity.
Finally, Dabin also recognizes that the church might request financial assistance from the State and also seek to provide religious instruction in the public
4
schools.
In searching for instances of what Dabin would call justifiable State intervention in the spiritual sphere, one might note that it was not the crowning
point of the late Cardinal Spellman's career that he managed to generate
enough pressure on the New York Board of Regents to induce them to revoke
the license for the exhibition of the motion picture "The Miracle."'5 The
Board of Regents acted in reliance upon a statute prohibiting the exhibition
of "sacrilegious" films in New York. Fortunately, the Supreme Court of the
United States unanimously reversed the judgment of a New York court upholding the banning of "The Miracle" and it is extremely doubtful whether
statutes covering blasphemy and sacrilege have any further validity in this
country. 6 Turning to a field in which the Catholic Church has not been as
active as several Protestant sects, as recently as this year two states prohibited
the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools. I understand that

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. The case which eventually reached the Supreme Court of the United States was
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Cardinal Spellman's role in the
controversy and other surrounding circumstances are related in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion. Id. at 507-16.
6. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra note 5. The Burstyn case was the first
in this country to consider the concept of "sacrilege." Blasphemy, on the other hand,
was an offense known to the common law. Prosecution for blasphemy was, in the early
19th century, sometimes justified as preventing "annoyance . . . of the public." See
Vidal v. Girard, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 61, 84 (1844) (opinion of Mr. Justice Story).
Later cases limited prosecution only to those instances where the blasphemy tended to
disturb the peace. See. e.g., Neola v. Reichart, 131 Iowa 492, 109 N.W. 5 (1906) ; Town
of Torrington v. Taylor, 59 Wyo. 109, 137 P.2d 621 (1943). However, a breach of the
peace was found in one case where a man said "damn" while standing in a church
door. Orf v. State, 147 Miss. 160, 113 So. 202 (1927).
Perhaps -.-here immediate public violence is threatened, a blasphemy prosecution
would still lie. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). The recent trend of
decisions makes even this proposition an uncertain one. See also Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1964). Nevertheless, a man was recently sentenced to thirty days
in jail by a Westminster, Maryland magistrate for taking the Lord's name in vain.
NEWSWEEK,

July 29, 1968, at 31.
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an attempt is now being made to repeal this prohibition in one state 7 and
in the other it is being challenged in the courts as an abridgement of the
8
constitutional right of freedom of speech.
I do not want to get into the question of the use of public funds in religious
schools or of tax exemption for certain types of church property. 9 I only cite
these problems, as I do the sacrilege and evolution cases, because they are
all instances where it is the churches themselves that are seeking State intervention in spiritual matters, despite the fact that most churches maintain that
religious matters are beyond the competence of the State, are beyond the realm
of that notion of "justice" which is embodied in the positive law. But Dabin,
who believes that this type of State intervention on behalf of religion is sometimes justified, has not even scratched the surface of the areas where an unwilling State has been forced by the churches themselves to become involved
not only in furthering the interests of religious bodies but actually to become
involved in the internal affairs of churches. It is to these cases I shall now
turn.
Churches, like any other bodies that attempt to perpetuate themselves and
to organize men for a common purpose, must mobilize material resources. But
control of property has never been without its problems, even for churches.
Although American courts, and English secular courts at least since the 19th
century, have been extremely reluctant to interfere in the affairs of private,
non-commercial associations, such as churches and clubs, disputes among
church members over control of church property have led to repeated requests
for judicial assistance by the losers in the religious forum. Despite the gravest
misgivings, the courts have been unable blanketly to refuse to entertain such
requests, because disputes over control of property cannot be left for settlement by self-help measures, and the State cannot rationally adopt a policy of
deciding all disputes over church property in favor of whoever happens to be
in possession of the property. The types of disputes that have overflowed
religious forums are almost infinitely varied. I shall for the present restrict
my consideration to those cases which are most instructive for our present
purpose, namely those disputes over church property which are rooted in disputes over church doctrine or organization. We may distinguish between two
types of churches for purposes of this discussion. First, there are hierarchical
7. Mississippi, based on a conversation (May 27, 1968) with an official in the Mississippi Secretary of State's Office. The statute is Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 6798-99 (1942).
In 1967 Tennessee repealed its famous statute, Tenn. Acts, 1925, ch. 27, §§ 1, 2.
8. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628 (1947). The case is Epperson v. Arkansas,
242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322, prob. juris. noted, 390 U.S. 941 (1968) (No. 749, 1967
Term; renumbered No. 7, 1968 Term).
9. The taxation of church property will be touched on in connection with the
state's power to define what is a religion and what is a church for civil law purposes.
See text accompanying note 34 infra.
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churches of which the Roman Catholic Church is an example, but by no
means the only example in American life. Churches governed by general assemblies, such as the Presbyterian Church, are also classified as hierarchical
churches for these purposes, although they do not have bishops, or what some
might call an ecclesiastical hierarchy. The second type of church relevant for
the present discussion is the congregational type, in which the local congregation is a completely autonomous body. Obviously there are examples of
churches neither clearly hierarchical nor clearly congregational.
Where property is given unconditionally for use as a religious body may
see fit, the majority of the congregation, if it is a congregational church, or
the governing authority in the church, if it is a hierarchical church, has for all
practical purposes complete control over the use and disposition of the
property.' 0 The cases which have required the State's intervention have involved
property which was given to a religious group either expressly or by clear
implication either to support particular religious beliefs or upon the condition
that the group continue to maintain a particular body of religious beliefs. 11
10. The leading case is Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871)

(hierarchical

church). What constitutes an effective majority (half? two-thirds?) for certain purposes may be regulated by religious corporation laws in the various states. Further
citation and a discussion of the entire subject can be obtained in Note, The Impact
of Intra-Church Property Disputes on the Ecumenical Movement, 1967 Wis. L. REV.
497. A very recent case on point is Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 249 Md. 650, 241 A.2d 691 (1968),
appeal docketed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3056 (U.S. July 31, 1968) (No. 357) (congregational
church).
The Church of God case is of particular interest because it raises the question of the
constitutionality of Maryland statutes which seemingly require control of church
property to be in the hands of the local congregation. The Roman Catholic and other
specifically mentioned hierarchical churches are governed by separate statutory provisions. In another recent case, the federal courts held unconstitutional an Alabama
statute permitting a 65% majority of a local congregation to sever its connection with
the parent church and to take with it control of the local church property. Northside
Bible Church v. Goodson, 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967). (Apparently most of the congregation thought that the social positions of the Methodist Church were too radical.)
11. The Church of God case, supra note 10, is also interesting because it refers to
the discussion in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871), that declares that,
unlike American law, the English law of its day would, in all cases of disputes about
church property, inquire into the nature of the beliefs of the contending parties. Id.
at 727-28. The Maryland court in the Church of God case expressed this supposed difference of approach more guardedly in terms of a willingness to find "an implied
trust on the part of those who gave the property to the local church that the trust
res would be used for the promulgation of the faith and doctrines in effect when the
property was given, even though there was no express provision to that effect in
making the gift." 249 Md. at 660, 241 A.2d at 697. The English case cited for this
proposition, Attorney General ex rel. Mander v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135
(1817), supports no such broad conclusion, however. In that case, Lord Eldon
entered into doctrinal questions only because he expressly held that a detailed examination of the terms of the trust in the light of the surrounding circumstances showed
that "they did not mean to invest in the Trustees, or the major part of them, any right
to vary the system or plan of doctrinal teaching . . . according to their own discre-
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In these cases the dispute over the control of property is just a part, albeit a
very important part, of the overall doctrinal disagreement. In the case of congregational churches it has been held by the courts that where any such restriction on the use of property can be made out, control over the property
will be given to the orthodox minority and not to the majority which has
voted to change the religious beliefs or practices of the congregation. 12 When
the use of property is held to be so restricted it obviously limits the ability
of the local congregation either to merge with other congregations having
different basic beliefs or to join even a moderately hierarchical type of church.
Normally, these disputes concern the use of the church building and church
endowments, but they have even involved the use of communion plates and
baptismal basins.
13
An interesting recent case involved the Second Church of Boston. It had
received a silver basin for "the purpose of most holy baptism" in 1706. In
1711 it received a silver dish "for the use of the Communion table." At the
time these gifts were made the church was a Trinitarian Congregational
Church in which the sacraments of baptism and holy communion were of
great importance. In the early part of the nineteenth century the Second
Church adopted Unitarianism, and it gradually abandoned the celebration of
the sacraments. Considering that the two silver pieces had not been used for
sacramental purposes for some time, and considering that the two pieces

tion," 3 Mer. at 411, 36 Eng. Rep. at 154, a conclusion which on the facts of the case
was certainly not unjustified.
Craigdallie v. Aikman, 2 Bligh 529, 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (1820), a case cited in Watson
v. Jones in support of that court's similar interpretation of the Pearson case, does not
support any such interpretation, nor, contrary to Mr. Justice Miller's intimations, does
it indicate that English judges were at that time, because of the existence of an Established Church or otherwise, eager to decide theological questions. Indeed, a reading
of the case reveals the exact opposite. The most that the court in Watson v. Jones
could arguably have properly said on the question of the English law of that period is
that English courts might, at that time, have been more willing to find a trust than
would American courts, but, in the light of subsequent developments in this country,
contrary to the intimations in the Church of God case, even this conclusion would
probably not be valid today. See, e.g., cases cited notes 12 and 14 infra; cf. Note, supra
note 10.
12. A fairly recent case in point is Berkaw v. Mayflower Congregational Church, 378
Mich. 239, 144 N.W.2d 444 (1966); cf. Newhall v. Second Church & Soc'y of Boston,
349 Mass. 493, 209 N.E.2d 296 (1965). It would be possible, of course, for the courts
to rule that regardless of the intention of the grantor, and however he may express that
intention, all gifts to religious institutions shall be treated as unconditional gifts which
the ruling bodies of those institutions can dispose of as they wish. The courts have not
taken this position, however, and I see no reason why the normal doctrines of law relative to gifts of property should be held to have no application in the religious sphere.
The separation of church and state does not seem to me to require such an extreme
result, a result which would sacrifice the freedom of the individual in the name of
religious autonomy.
13. Newhall v. Second Church & Soc'y of Boston, supra note 12.
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were the work of Edward Winslow, a renowned early American silversmith,
the Second Church wished to sell the pieces to a member of the duPont family
for presentation to a museum in Wilmington, Delaware. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that the Second Church did not have the unlimited power to dispose of these items and it issued an injunction restraining
the church from selling these pieces.
Hierarchical churches have not been immune from these kinds of disputes. A
most interesting case was one heard in the House of Lords in 1904.14 While
there are countless differences in church-state relationships between Great
Britain and the United States, I believe an examination of this case will be useful because of the importance of the issue involved.
In the 1840's the Church of Scotland underwent a schism. A group with
a majority of the lay members of the church separated from the established
church and formed a new body called the Free Church of Scotland which
claimed to be the Church of Scotland. The reason for the schism was that the
members of what became the Free Church objected to State interference in
the appointment of clergy in the Church of Scotland. The Free Church was
not against the establishment principle as such, however, because it firmly believed that the State should support the church. It merely rejected all State
control over the church and was willing to forgo State financial assistance if
State control was the quid pro quo. Divorced from the public purse, the Free
Church embarked on an urgent campaign to secure independent financial
support. In this campaign it was singularly successful and large amounts of
money and real property were given to the Free Church for its support. The
ultimate legislative authority of the Free Church, as in the Church of Scotland from which it had separated, was in a General Assembly. In 1900 the
General Assembly of the Free Church voted to merge the Free Church with
the United Presbyterian Church, which was also a nineteenth century schismatic offshoot of the Church of Scotland. The United Church differed in
some important doctrinal respects from the Free Church. In the first place it
not only rejected State control over the church; it also rejected State support
14. General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Lord Overtoun, [1904) A.C.
515 (Scot.). For a somewhat related American case involving a similar hierarchical
church see Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian
Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690, cert. granted sub. nor. Presbyterian Church in
the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,. 88 S. Ct.
2060 (1968) (No. 1380, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 71, 1968 Term), a case discussed,
infra, at note 17. See also Lutheran Free Church v. Lutheran Free Church (Not Merged),
273 Minn. 332, 141 N.W.2d 827 (1966) where the majority faction of the Lutheran
Free Church that had voted to merge with other Lutheran churches in the American
Lutheran Church successfully enjoined the minority from using the name "Lutheran
Free Church," but not before the court assured itself that the majority had acted
canonically and that, in entering into the merger, the majority had not deviated from
any fundamental doctrines of the church.
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for the church. It was, in short, against the establishment principle. In the
second place, the United Church did not subscribe to the strict doctrine of
predestination which had been a part of the Confession of Faith of the
Church of Scotland from its inception. To get around these differences, the
terms of the merger of the United and the Free Churches left each member of
15
the merged church free to maintain his traditional beliefs on these matters.
The dissenting minority in the Free Church who were opposed to the merger
-mainly members of poor highland parishes-brought suit to get control of
the property of the former Free Church and to prevent it from being transferred to the merged church which was called the United Free Church of
Scotland. When the case reached the House of Lords in 1904, a majority of
their Lordships sustained this claim, although, the following year, their decision was superseded by an Act of Parliament. 16 According to the majority of
the law lords the establishment principle and the doctrine of predestination
were key beliefs of the Church of Scotland and of the Free Church of Scotland. Those who responded to the appeals of the Free Church for financial
assistance in the mid-nineteenth century did so in order to support a church
maintaining these beliefs. While the General Assembly of the Free Church
had the power to revise the doctrines of the Free Church, it did not follow
that property given to support one body of beliefs would be available to support another. 17 On the other hand, of course, where a substantial direct connection between the receipt of certain property and the maintenance of certain beliefs cannot be made out, the property will follow the reformers who
control the church government.
15. General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Lord Overtoun, supra note 14, at
629. The Free Church had tried to abandon the doctrine of predestination in 1892.
Id. at 625.
16. Act, 5 Edw. 7, c. 12 (1905). This statute provided, roughly, for pro-rating
of the property of the old Free Church between the United Free Church and the adherents of the old church based on the allegiance of the individual congregations.
17. The Free Church of Scotland case is therefore distinguishable from an analogous recent American case, Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Eastern Heights
Presbyterian Church, supra note 14, where several local churches sought to withdraw
from the Presbyterian Church and to take with them property whose legal title was in
the local churches, because of alleged doctrinal changes by the Presbyterian Church.
One of the alleged changes related to the doctrine of "foreordination" but the others
related to pronouncements by the Presbyterian Church on Vietnam, civil rights, civil
disobedience, and bible reading in schools, all allegedly contrary to the Church's principle of non-intervention in civil matters. A jury decided that these pronouncements
amounted to substantial abandonments of the original tenets of the Presbyterian Church
of the United States. This is, therefore, a more radical case than the Free Church of
Scotland case. The only question the House of Lords examined was whether certain
property could be said to have been given for the support of certain doctrines. Given
the dramatic context out of which the Free Church was formed, the House of Lords'
decision was a supportable one. There was, on the other hand, very little evidence in
the Georgia case as to how much the acquisition of certain property by the local
churches was conditioned on the maintenance of certain beliefs by the local congregation and by the Presbyterian Church in the United States.
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The Free Church of Scotland case has important implications. In the 1950's
the Russian Orthodox Church in America, which had renounced the administrative. control of the Patriarch in Moscow, sued to gain possession of St.
Nicholas Cathedral in New York which was in the possession of an archbishop
appointed by Moscow. Title to the cathedral was held by a corporation organized for the purpose of acquiring a cathedral for the Russian Orthodox
Church in America as a central place of worship and as a residence of the
ruling archbishop "in accordance with the doctrine, discipline and worship
of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Church of Eastern Confession as taught by the
holy scriptures, holy tradition, seven oecumenical councils and holy fathers
of that church." 18 The record in the case showed that before the Russian
Revolution the Russian Orthodox Church in America was controlled from
Russia and that the Patriarch of Moscow had never renounced his authority
over the Russian Orthodox churches in America. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that neither the legislature nor the courts of
New York State could deprive the archbishop appointed by Moscow of possession of the Cathedral. 19 One might speculate, half humorously, that, if
the English courts in the time of Henry VIII were willing to take the same
view of the law, there would perhaps never have been a split with Rome.
The moral to be learned from these cases is that perhaps the individual
members of churches have a right founded in justice or what have you-a
right that courts of law will sometimes protect-in the maintenance of the
orthodoxy of their church. People presumably join churches because they
share and are willing to subscribe to the declared beliefs of the church. It perhaps is not unreasonable on the part of such people to expect the church
which they have joined to continue to subscribe, at least, to the most important of those beliefs. After all, a religious organization is not formed primarily
to permit people who individually possess little power to secure, by union,
political, economic or social power but rather to pursue spiritual goals. When
these people's expectations are disappointed, that is, when the church has
changed its beliefs or its organization despite these people's objections, for
want of any other source to turn to they will turn to the State and attempt
to wage guerrilla warfare against the reformers by striking at the economic
base of the reformed church. In religion, then, justice, at least as conceived of
18. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North
America, 344 U.S. 94, 95 (1952).
19. The Kedroff case, supra note 18, involved the operation of a statute. The attempt
to accomplish the same result solely by court order was struck down summarily in
Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North America,
363 U.S. 190 (1960). A recent case applying these decisions is Northside Bible Church
v. Goodson, supra note 10; cf. Serbian Orthodox Church Congregation of St. Demetrius
v. Kelemen (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Jud. Dist., Oct. 23, 1967), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.
L.W. 3015 (U.S. May 13, 1968) (No. 1427; renumbered No. 91, 1968 Term).
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by the State, may not require that the majority should rule, but rather that
orthodoxy should prevail. The justification of such a policy may lie in the fact
that in a free society no one is compelled by the civil law to remain in a
church; in this respect the church is unlike the State itself which may, and
often does, prohibit its citizens from renouncing their allegiance to it.
Church members have sought justice in the law courts of the State not
only when they have had doctrinal or organizational disputes with their
church. As a body dealing in the world of men, churches engage in commercial relationships, and no one has seriously suggested that church members
who engage in commercial relations with their church should be without the
right to seek the help of the State's courts to resolve disputes which have
arisen out of such relationships. But an individual's relations with his church
are not limited to the contractual and property relations with which the civil
law is familiar. Most religious bodies have procedures, often very elaborate
procedures, for maintaining church discipline. Elemental notions of fairness
would require that, when a church has established certain procedures for
resolving internal disputes, i.e., disputes as to whether a priest has the right
to preach, a member is entitled to receive the sacraments, etc., the church
should in good faith follow these procedures when they are by their terms
applicable. Unfortunately, whatever the notions of fairness might require,
the State has fairly successfully been able to resist the cries for intervention
to set things right by those who claim that they have been unfairly treated by
their church. Only when property or contract interests are involved, which is
not often the case, will a reluctant State intervene. Thus, if the rules of a church
provide that a pastor cannot be removed except upon thirty days' notice,
the State will enforce the right of the pastor to exercise the economic functions of his office until the thirty days' notice has been properly given.2 0
I have thus far been discussing the cases, and most of the cases have been of
this nature, where a very reluctant State has been dragged into essentially
religious matters because of irreconcilable disputes among the members of
a church. There are, nevertheless, some areas even in America where the
State has sought to intervene in what many would claim are essentially
religious matters, despite the fact that neither the church nor any of its members have asked for this intervention. A very familiar instance is the forcing
of the Mormon Church to renounce the practice, although not the doctrine,
of polygamy when the state of Utah was admitted into the Union.2 1 The case
20. St. John's Greek Catholic Hungarian Russian Orthodox Church of Rahway v.
Fedak, 96 N.J. Super. 556, 233 A.2d 663 (1967). Some other church cases are cited
in notes 37 and 40 infra. In a church in which membership carries a pro-rata ownership of church property, membership itself is partially an economic interest which
will receive some protection from action not in accordance with church rules.
21. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) where a prosecution for big-
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which interests me more because it is more relevant to contemporary problems
is the serious problem which was avoided when the eighteenth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States went into effect. The wording of the
eighteenth amendment seems absolute. The purchase, sale, transportation,
manufacture, and importation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes
was prohibited. Although to some it might seem a strained reading of the
amendment, the use of wine in the sacrament of holy communion was not
considered to be "for beverage purposes." The Volstead Act which imple22
mented the eighteenth amendment made this clear.
The problems, however, have not faded away with the fortunate repeal of
prohibition. The State has felt free to prohibit the use of rattlesnakes in
religious ceremonies, however essential their use might be under the doctrines
of any church. 23 The State as parens patriae reserves to itself the right to have
the last word as to what is in the interest of the health and safety of its citizens, and it will not surrender this right to the churches. The case for State
supremacy seems clearer when, as in the case of the use of rattlesnakes in
religious ceremonies, the practice is patently dangerous to life. State intervention can perhaps also be justified when the beliefs of a church-such as the
belief that no Christian should seek medical attention, or certain kinds of
medical attention such as transfusions and injections-are applied by the
adult members of the church so as to jeopardize the lives of their children.
At any rate, the State has not been unwilling to interfere in this area as
well. 24 There was, of course, the outrageous case in the District of Columbia
where doctors at Georgetown Hospital secured a court order authorizing them
to give a transfusion to an otherwise sane and rational adult, who, as a
amy while Utah was still a territory was sustained as against the objection that, in the
case of the Mormons, such prosecution interfered with their freedom of religion as
guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution. In 1890 the
President of the Mormon Church announced his intention to submit to the law, the
general Council of the Church supported him and withdrew the authority to solemnize
multiple marriages, and finally in 1896 Utah became a state. See 22 ENcY. BRIT. 910
(1965 ed.); 13 ENcy. BRIT. 799 (1965 ed.).
22. National Prohibition Act of 1919, tit. II, §§ 3, 6, 41 Stat. 308, 310.
23. Statutes making it a crime to handle poisonous snakes so as to endanger life or
health have been upheld, e.g., in Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956);
State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed sub nom. Bunn v. North
Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949) (Durham city ordinance); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn.
17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
24. In Jehovah's Witnesses v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash., 1967), a statute authorizing the courts of Washington State to issue orders for
the welfare of minors "grossly and wilfully neglected as to medical care" was upheld
as against the claim that the Washington courts were applying the statute to order
transfusions for minors over the objections of their parents and sometimes of the minors
themselves. Even without such a statute courts have issued such orders in these circumstances. See People ex. rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
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Jehovah's Witness, refused to permit the transfusion, despite the fact that the
doctors asserted she would die without it. 25 What makes this case outrageous,
and it has been justly condemned, 26 is not the fact that the State invaded the
religious sphere. The principle is exactly the same even if the woman's refusal
were not based upon any religious belief. In our society it is part of an adult's
constitutionally protected freedom, so long as he is otherwise in full control
of his faculties, to resist any and all tampering with his body so long as it
does not affect the safety of others. He can be vaccinated against his will to
prevent the contagion of others27 but if he wishes to die rather than permit
his leg to be amputated or rather than permit a transfusion he must be
28
permitted to die, however much it may grieve his doctor.
The tough case would be one where the State absolutely prohibited the use
of alcoholic beverages so that the use of wine in the sacrament of holy communion were prohibited. 29 Alcoholic beverages might in some manner of
speaking, even when taken in moderation, pose some slight danger to health,
but they are not dangerous in the sense that rattlesnakes or LSD are danger25. Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, rehearing en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964). The rehearing en banc was denied on the ground that since the transfusion
had been given and the order expired, the case was moot. Judge Miller filed a particularly bitter dissent, in which he was joined by Judges Burger and Bastian, 331 F.2d at
1011.
26. In addition to Judge Miller's remarks, cited supra note 25, see also the strong
unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois in In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d
361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). But cf. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.
Conn. 1965). In the Brooks case the Illinois court chose to decide the case although
the treatment had been given and the original order had expired. This was in order to
give instruction to lower courts that might otherwise be tempted to issue similar
orders. I do not believe that the subsequent vacating of a court order would expose a
doctor who executed the order to liability under state law. Conceivably, a doctor acting under a state court order against the wishes of an adult patient could be sued
under an old federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)) that has received increased
attention in recent years and that permits a civil action against anyone who, under
"color of state law," deprives a person of rights secured under the constitution and
laws of the United States. This argument was made in the Jehovah's Witnesses case,
supra note 24, but the court refused on procedural grounds to consider the issue. A
doctor in the District of Columbia could not be reached under this statute, since the
statute only applies to state action.
27. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
28. See In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) ; cf. Mulloy v.
Hop Sang, [1935] 1 W.W.R. 714 (App. Div. Alberta Sup. Ct.) (amputation of arm).
29. In 1967 the Arkansas legislature passed an act (Act No. 120), which became
law without the Governor's signature, that made it a crime, and in the case of multiple
violations a felony punishable by a jail term of up to fifty years, to serve wine to persons
under 21. An attempt expressly to exempt the serving of communion wine was defeated. The Episcopal Bishop of Little Rock announced his intentions to defy the
law and to instruct his clergy likewise. See Slavin, A Primer for Spartans, 11 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 570 (1967). Fortunately this act was superseded by Act No. 277, which expressly allowed the serving of wine in religious ceremonies. ARK. STATS. ANN. § 48903 (Supp. 1967).
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ous. What about the use of peyote or marijuana in religious ceremonies? 30 The
scientific evidence thus far available indicates that these substances are even
less harmful than alcoholic beverages. When taken to excess, alcoholic beverages are universally recognized as very dangerous. Excessive use of peyote and
marijuana is not considered by many people to be as dangerous, at least insofar as lasting physical effects are concerned. There is, nevertheless, no question that the majority of persons in this country, and that includes the vast
majority of religious persons, feel that the use of peyote and marijuana in religious ceremonies should not be permitted.
In two recent cases the issue was squarely presented whether statutes making it a crime to possess or use peyote or marijuana could constitutionally be
applied against a person who claimed that he used them in connection with
religious ceremonies which incorporated the use of these drugs as part of the
ritual. In the first case, People v. Woody,31 decided in 1964, the Supreme
Court of California held that a statute making possession of peyote a crime
could not be applied to an American Indian who was a member of the "Native American Church" and who had used peyote in a religious ceremony.
The use of peyote is an essential part of the Native American Church, which,
although a somewhat informally organized church, has a substantial following among American Indians. Peyote is believed to embody the Holy Spirit,
and the use of peyote in religious ceremonies is believed to bring the user into
direct contact with God. The California court pointed out that peyote had
been used by the Indians in religious ceremonies since at least the mid-sixteenth century, although Peyotism has never been adopted as an official belief
by any American Indian tribe, and some tribes even forbid its use. The court
relied on the fact that the use of peyote has no lasting effect on humans and
that the State had not produced any evidence to support the State's claim
that the use of peyote would or even could lead to the use of dangerous narcotics. Noting that the defendant's sincere belief in Peyotism was unquestioned, the Supreme Court of California held that the United States Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom precluded the defendant's conviction.
The court was assisted in reaching this decision by the fact that the use of
30. A more extended discussion of the legal aspects of the subject is contained in
Note, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 52 (1967). For a discussion of the more spiritual aspects of
psychedelic experiences, see Watts, Psychedelics and Religious Experience, 56 CALIF.
L. REV. 74 (1968) and Clark, Religious Aspects of Psychedelic Drugs, 56 CALIF. L.
REv. 86 (1968). For a discussion of the subject in the context of Dr. Leary's case,
see Finer, Psychedelics and Religious Freedom, 19 HASTINOS L.J. 667 (1968).
31. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). Cf. In re
Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964), where a writ of habeas
corpus was granted and petitioner, previously convicted of possessing peyote, was

remanded to the custody of a trial court for the determination of whether his belief in
Peyotism was genuine.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. XVIII

peyote in religious ceremonies was permitted by statute in New Mexico and
32
Montana and by judicial decision in Arizona.
The second and more recent of the two cases I wish to discuss is State v.
Bullard,33 decided in 1966 by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Marijuana and peyote had been found in Bullard's apartment in Chapel Hill.
Among Bullard's defenses was the claim that he was a Peyotist with Buddhist
leanings and that he had recently jointed the Neo-American Church. The
beliefs and rituals of the Neo-American Church were apparently almost
identical with those of the Native American Church discussed in the Woody
case in California. While the Supreme Court of North Carolina declared
that there was evidence which would justify a jury in doubting the bona fideness of Bullard's belief in Peyotism, it went on to hold that, in its view, the
Constitution of the United States did not prevent a State from absolutely
prohibiting the use of hallucinatory drugs such as peyote. Even if it is correct
in the result reached in the particular case before it where defendant's good
faith could legitimately be questioned, the approach of the North Carolina
court seems wrong. Where a religious practice offends the moral standards of
the majority but is neither harmful to its practitioners nor to the community
at large (other than by shocking its moral sense), justice would require that
in a country devoted to religious freedom, the sincere believer be permitted to
engage in the practice. As a corollary to this principle, when the State grants
tax exemptions to religious institutions, so long as a purported religious institution's beliefs are not directed primarily to economic or political action
and are not otherwise illegal, the State should not deny the exemption to a
body whose beliefs are unorthodox, e.g., the rejection of the Judaeo-Christian
concept of God.

34

B. Justice and PrivateEducationalInstitutions
I should now like to move the focus of our attention to private institutions,
32. People v. Woody, supra note 31, at 723-24, 394 P.2d at 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
33. 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
34. See the discussion and the cases cited in Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968). For an illustration of
the sorts of issues that can arise where the State grants tax exemptions only to some

types of church property, cf. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Henning,
[1964] A.C. 420 (1963), where a Mormon temple in Godstone, England was denied an
exemption from local property taxes on the ground that it was not a "place of public
religious worship" owing to the fact that a Mormon Temple, unlike a Mormon Chapel,
was not open to the general public but only to Mormons in good standing. Lord Evershed, who reluctantly concurred in this interpretation of the statutory language because
he did not wish to register a lone dissent, pointed out that a place of "public religious
worship" could be a place where a number of people worshipped together in public, as
opposed to a place of individual or family worship. Id. at 430, 434. A respectable argument drawn from legal authority could be marshalled for this view, which seems to me
to be more sensible besides being more imaginative.
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particularly to private religiously affiliated universities. Universities are part
of a wide spectrum of private associations. Insofar as such associations concern themselves solely with social or religious matters, it is only with extreme
reluctance that the law courts of the State will intervene. This principle of
non-interference by the State, which is premised upon a preference for freedom of association, is reinforced by the unsuitability of legal remedies for
dealing with intra-group disagreements. It is possible, however, for private associations to perform functions which are not in popular parlance strictly
social or religious.
The range of functions a private association can perform is practically
limitless, but at one end of this range are functions often performed by the
State itself. A clear example is a county medical association, membership in
which is necessary if a physician is to be able to use the facilities of the local
hospitals. Since in controlling effective entry into the practice of medicine in
that particular locality the county medical society is performing a function
often, and perhaps normally or more properly, performed by the State itself,
the county medical society, in return for the power which it exercises, will be
subjected to some of the limitations which the law imposes upon official
conduct.35 Again, and in an analogous vein, if the State grants certain privileges and powers to trade unions, including the right to compel workers to
join them, the unions cannot complain when the State imposes certain stand36
ards of responsibility upon them.
Even with regard to private associations which do not exercise quasi-public
functions or which have not been granted the legal power to compel membership in them, the State quite properly exercises some control over their relations with their members. As with churches, where economic interests are involved a private association such as a club will be compelled to comply with
its own regulations for resolving disputes. 37 Even more important for our pur35. See Falcone v. Middlesex Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961);
cf. Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All E.R. 109, 119-20 (C.A.). For a discussion
of the entire subject of the impact of the law on private associations, see Judicial
Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983 (1963).
36. See, e.g., Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 101, 29
U.S.C. § 411 (1964); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964).
37. See People ex. rel. Meads v. Alpha Lodge No. 1, 13 Misc. 677, 35 N.Y.S. 214
(Sup. Ct. 1895), aff'd sub nom. People ex. rel. Meads v. McDonough, 8 App. Div. 591,
40 N.Y.S. 1147 (1896) (social club functioning also as insurance company); Briscoe
v. Williams, 192 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946) (attempt to oust pastor and keep
him off church property); Randolph v. First Baptist Church, 53 Ohio Op. 288, 120
N.E.2d 485 (C.P. 1954); Young v. Ladies Imperial Club, Ltd. [1920] 2 K.B. 523
(C.A.); People ex. rel. Decker v. Hoboken Turtle Club, 60 Hun 576, 14 N.Y.S. 76 (Sup.
Ct. 1891).
In the club situation, payment of dues can give the member a contractual right in
the maintenance of the club's rules even in the absence of other economic injury,
although in most clubs members in good standing, as owners of club property, would
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poses, there will be limits to what private associations can do vis a vis their
members even in complete compliance with their internal rules. The modem
cases indicate that a social club cannot deny a member the right to use club
facilities because he votes for a Democratic candidate or because he favors
Medicare. 38 While a club might use these criteria to refuse to admit a person to membership it would be too great an inhibition to public discussion
and political freedom to permit a man to be denied the right to play golf at
his club because he took part in the public debate of the issues of the day. The
social purposes of the club may not be held to permit suppression of this kind
of dissent. The difficult cases arise where it might be said that the purpose of
the association legitimately carries with it the right to suppress some dissent.
A political party might be -able to expel a member who refuses to support its
candidates and policies. 39 Likewise, a religious body can expel members who
refuse to accept its beliefs. Of course, in many of these cases the absence of
economic injury to the person expelled would preclude judicial intervention
in any event, but the principle seems the same regardless of the presence or
absence of an economic interest, although the presence of an economic interest would probably induce a court to examine at least whether the church has
followed its own procedures. 40 How much dissent an organization founded
for a specific purpose should permit with regard to its central purpose
seems to a large extent to be for the association itself to decide. We are assuming, of course, that the association's purpose is a lawful one in the first
place.
With this background in mind, let us turn to the private universities, particularly private religious universities. What are their purposes? What are
the interests that the State will protect? 41 More particularly what, if any,
are the economic interests involved? The rights of faculty can be fit more or
also theoretically divide the club's property, if any, among themselves upon dissolution
of the club. Members of congregational churches and of some hierarchical churches
have similar rights upon dissolution of the church, and this is the basis for judicial
intervention in cases such as the Randolph case cited in this note.
38. See Gallaher v. American Legion, 154 Misc. 281, 277 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct.), afJ'd
mem., 242 App. Div. 604, 271 N.Y.S. 1012 (1934) (American Legion as a social clubtype of organization cannot expel local post for opposing political stands of national
organization); State ex. rel. Waring v. Georgia Medical Soc'y, 38 Ga. 608 (Super Ct.
1869) (cannot expel member for providing bail for Negro accused of a crime). Cf.
Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d
862 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (cannot prevent members, by association rule providing for
expulsion, from testifying in court in a manner disparaging to other doctors).
39. See Brandenburger v. Jefferson Club Ass'n, 88 Mo. App. 148 (1901).
40. Randolph v. First Baptist Church, supra note 37, is a typical case. For other
church cases see Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, supra note 35, at
1021-23, and Note, supra note 10, at 509-11.
41. For a comprehensive review of the law on this aspect of this article, see Academic
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
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less into the employer-employee pattern of relationships. As for students, their
relationship to an educational institution is often compared to that of a child
to his parents, but it is an odd kind of family relationship because the university family claims the right to expel him, something that is difficult for the
natural family to do, and because the child in the university family has traditionally had very few rights against his alma mater, fewer than against his
natural mother. When a student pays his tuition, what is he buying or paying
for? If he is expelled from the university or school, what relief would he want
to seek? I presume that his primary interest is not whether he can sue for a
refund of his tuition, although that is his clearest and most immediate economic loss.
In 1962 two Roman Catholic students at St. John's University in Brooklyn
were married in a civil ceremony and two other Roman Catholic students
at St. John's served as witnesses at the ceremony. 42 One of the witnesses
subsequently publicly disclosed this fact. Thereupon, after a hearing, all four
students were expelled from the university. The university supported its action as follows: The regulations of the university, the pertinent portions of
which were printed in the university's bulletins, stated:
"In conformity with the ideals of Christian education and conduct,
the University reserves the right to dismiss a student at any time on
whatever grounds the University judges advisable. Each student by
his admission to the University recognizes this right. The continuance of any student on the roster of the University, the receipt of
academic credit, graduation, the granting of a degree or a certificate, rest solely within the powers of the University. '43
By participating in a civil marriage, the students violated their religious duty
as Catholics and gave public scandal to the student body of the university.
Since the university was founded inter alia to "enable men and women to
develop in learning and culture according to the philosophical and theological principles and traditions of the Roman Catholic Church," 44 and since
the university had reserved to itself the right of dismissal for any cause, the
university contended that expulsion was totally proper.
There is no question, of course, that the students were aware of the university regulations just quoted. Presumably, therefore, the regulations were
"part" of their contract with St. John's University. The case was nevertheless
42. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty.),
rev'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962). The facts are most completely presented in the opinion of the
trial court (Supreme Court, Kings County). I shall, however, sometimes, for the sake of
conciseness of reference, use the opinions of the other courts that heard the case to
support of my statement of the facts of the case.
43. Supra note 42, 17 App. Div. 2d at 633, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
44. Supra note 42, 34 Misc. 2d at 320, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
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a very difficult one. One of the students, the husband in the civil marriage, had
completed all the requirements for the bachelor of science degree and was
waiting for the university's next commencement to receive his degree. His
wife and one of the witnesses were seniors. Upon being informed of the university's decision to expel them, the students were remarried with the same witnesses before a priest. 45 Shortly thereafter the university formally confirmed
its action and the students went to court to obtain relief. The trial court
granted that relief on the grounds that the university's regulations under
which the students were expelled were so vague as to afford no basis for proceeding against the students. 46 The court started from the premise that a
university cannot take a student's fees and then deny him a degree for no
reason at all. 47 By paying his tuition the student secured a contractual right
to receive a degree if he fulfilled the university's academic requirements.
It was, of course, to get around this principle of contract law that St. John's
University adopted the regulations just quoted so as to possess by contract
the right to deny degrees and to expel for any reason the university thought
fit. On appeal this decision was reversed, the reason given being that universities possess the right to expel for misconduct, and the misconduct in the
instant case was at least arguably within the scope of the legitimate concern
of the university, given its goals and purposes. There was, however, a dissent
based on the premise that under the facts of the case there was no basis for
the university's action. The dissenters declared that
The University is a public institution, chartered by the State, open
to persons of all religious faiths, and engaged in providing secular
learning leading to a general academic degree. Such a University
may not enforce against a student an ecclesiastical law, the breach of
which is not immoral according to the standards of society in general, or which it does not enforce equally against all students at the
48
University, whether Catholic or non-Catholic.
In my view the argument of the dissenters is unanswerable, particularly
where, as was actually the case here, it was not necessary to be a Roman Catholic to become a member of the university community. The university's action
was based upon premises which amount to nothing less than an assertion of
the right to visit civil consequences upon a Catholic's constitutional right to
renounce his faith. In a free society no man by contract or otherwise can give
45. Supra note 42, 34 Misc. 2d at 321, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
46. Supra note 42, 34 Misc. 2d at 324, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 409-10.
47. This was the holding of an old New York case that a university could not arbitrarily refuse to permit a medical student to take his final examinations. People ex.
rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd mem.,
128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253, 14 N.Y.S. 462 (1891).
48. Supra note 42, 17 App. Div. 2d at 634, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
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up that right. Of course, a church may expel from the church itself members
who violate its rules and, even in a secular society, religious grounds should
be sufficient to justify expulsion of a student from a seminary. But to use
religious grounds to justify a refusal to award a general academic degree, a
degree whose value depends upon the State authorizing the university to
award the degree, is another matter. Times have changed, however, even since
1962. The changes in St. John's since the faculty strike of 1966 make it unlikely that students would be expelled today for participating in a civil marriage. For example, a Protestant has now been appointed to be academic vice
president and provost of St. John's University. 49 Nevertheless, should a case
like the one just described arise again I believe the position of the dissenters
would prevail.
The most important change in this area, however, is not the internal
changes which religious institutions are now undergoing, however important
and beneficial those changes may be. Rather, the most important change is
that the public purse is being tapped to support private educational institutions, including religious colleges and universities. The availability of public
funds puts pressure on these institutions to secularize themselves in order to
secure easier and greater access to the available funds. More importantly for
present purposes, the acceptance of public funds by a religiously affiliated
university opens it to the public function argument explored earlier in this
article. Insofar as a religious educational institution spends public funds, the
public becomes a partner, and not necessarily a silent partner in its undertakings. Even when the support is given without strings, the courts have shown
a tendency to treat some of the actions of private educational institutions as
"state action" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment or as United
States Government action for purposes of the fifth amendment. 50 In such cases
49. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1967, at 41, col. 8; id., Aug. 27, 1967, at 47, col. 1.
50. Tulane University, which was partially founded with State funds, receives a
special tax exemption for the income of its commercially leased real estate, and has
among its 17 trustees three public officials who held their position as trustees ex officio, was held to be engaged in "state action" in refusing to admit Negroes, Guillory
v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962), but this
finding was vacated on rehearing, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962). Tulane has, however, now desegregated. State action was found more recently in Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 88 Sup. Ct. 1811 (1968), where an orphans' school refused to
admit Negroes based on these major findings: (1) the school's trustees at one time (and
for over 125 years) were public officials who served ex officio; (2) the trustees were
appointed by the Orphans Court of Philadelphia; and (3) with the assistance of Philadelphia public school officials, the orphans' school actively solicited applicants from
the poor white male students of the Philadelphia public school system. Cf. Eaton v.
Grubb, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) where a private hospital receiving federal funds
was ordered to desegregate. For the practical implications of a finding of "state action"
see Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U.
FLA. L. Rav. 290 (1968).
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the courts will impose the same restrictions that are applicable against official
action to the actions of the religious institution. No organ of government,
for example, could punish a student for participating in a civil as opposed to
a religious marriage ceremony.
To sum up then, a private educational institution, whether religiously
affiliated or not, will be restrained by the requirements of the justice administered in the State's courts of law from exercising over students power which is
not justified by the educational institution's purpose. I believe the modem
tendency will be to read the institution's purposes quite narrowly and to deny
the institution the power of moral censor, particularly at the college and university level. The extent of this restraint will be limited by the requirement
that, for courts to intervene in the affairs of private institutions, some economic interest must be at stake. Thus until a private university, religious or
secular, accepts the student's tuition or makes him legally liable for the payment of his tuition, it has a much greater freedom of action with respect to
him. Moreover, although it may be restricted in its ability to expel a student for no cause at all, the same restrictions may very well not apply to the
cancelling of a scholarship or, at least, to the failure to renew a scholarship.
Scholarships from private institutions are considered more or less as gifts and,
by and large, no one has the right to a gift. As the private educational institution comes to receive and to rely on support from public funds, however,
this same justice will impose upon it more and more of the limitations applicable to government action, although without at the same time granting
it the privileges possessed by the government. When government action is involved, the economic nexus which is so important when private parties are
involved is not so crucial. Civil rights can be protected despite the fact that
51
they may not, even by stretching the point, have a cash value.
II. The Demands of Justice in Its Broader Sense
The time has now come to attempt some general remarks on justice and the
relations between individual men and the groups to which they belong. "Justice" shall now be used, not as a synonym for the law of the civil State, but
rather in its wider or moral sense. We may state, first of all, with a considerable degree of confidence, that at the very least justice requires that in dealing
with its members a group must follow its own established procedures and it
must be bound by its own regulations. Fairness, after all, is one of the components of the concept of justice. But does the individual have any other
51. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (right to use quasi-public park);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (right prior to Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to eat in privately run lunch counters on publicly-owned property).

1968]

Personal and Institutional Rights in Community

claims against his group besides the claim that he must be treated fairly?
When a church or other private association decides to change its beliefs or
policies, should the majority rule?
We normally think of majority rule as one of the essential components of
justice. I think we do this because majority rule is one means of implementing what I would call a more basic requirement of justice, namely, that those
bound by a rule must have had some participation in the formulation and
establishment of that rule, or have some means of seeking a change in an existing rule. I believe this is why, for example, the laws of the civil society are
binding in conscience, why in short the State is not the gunman situation
writ large. Majority rule is one means of assuring the necessary participation
of the individual in the formulation of the rules that bind him, but it is not
the only means. The chance to present our views to our rulers with the knowledge that they will carefully consider our views before coming to a conclusion may in some circumstances be enough of a participation in rule-making
to make obedience to group rules binding in conscience. I think the Catholic
Church is moving towards insuring this type of participation by its members
in its legislative deliberations and I believe it is a good thing. Certainly enlightened private educational institutions are also moving in this direction.
Is there also, however, a component of the notion of justice similar to what
I have called in the first part of my article "The demands of orthodoxy"?
Groups are often founded not only as a means for effective social action but
in order to protect certain agreed-upon values and ideals. In this case, the
notion of majority rule seems to be capable of abuse if a majority can bind the
minority to a change of values and ideals. I take it that the Constitution of
the United States embodies some such values and ideals. That is one of the
purposes of a written constitution. But society changes, the natural environment changes, and man's view of life might have to change accordingly. The
Constitution of the United States recognizes this possibility by permitting
amendments, but the amending process is made so complicated and difficult
that a mere majority is prevented from forcing its desire for a change in
basic values upon the rest of the citizens. The most usual manner of amending the Constitution of the United States requires passage by two-thirds of
both houses of the Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the States,
expressed either through state legislatures or special conventions called solely
for this purpose.5 2 For most groupings of human beings this seems an acceptable compromise. The need for effective group action, the requirement
that the individual be permitted to participate in the formulation of the rules
that bind him, and the requirements of orthodoxy in the sense of adherence
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to strongly held beliefs, are thus all reconciled. But what about religious
groups premised upon the absolute adherence of the group to certain beliefs
and values, such as the virgin birth of Christ, the resurrection of Christ, or
the redemption of sinners? Can justice, as expressed in the expectations of
the members of the church, demand the supremacy of the principle of orthodoxy so that no majority, however large, can change these beliefs so as to bind
even a minority of only one?
My own view is, "it depends." As long as the majority are free in conscience
to leave the group and this freedom is protected by the law of civil society,
then the absolute supremacy of orthodoxy in some circumstances is not per se
objectionable. People who have freely joined the group or who, having been
born into it, have elected to remain in the group can be said to have voluntarily accepted the burdens of orthodoxy. But if there is no such freedom, then
there must be some procedure for overcoming the strangle-hold of orthodoxy.
Otherwise men would be in bondage to values and ideals in which they no
longer believed, and group life which is normally a blessing would become a
curse.

